Binding lies by Avraham Merzel et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 14 October 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01566
Edited by:
Guy Hochman,
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel
Reviewed by:
Nina Mazar,
University of Toronto, Canada
Jason Dana,
University of Pennsylvania, USA
*Correspondence:
Avraham Merzel
avraham.merzel@mail.huji.ac.il
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 22 June 2015
Accepted: 28 September 2015
Published: 14 October 2015
Citation:
Merzel A, Ritov I, Kareev Y
and Avrahami J (2015) Binding lies.
Front. Psychol. 6:1566.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01566
Binding lies
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1 School of Education, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel, 2 The Federmann Center for the Study of
Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Do we feel bound by our own misrepresentations? Does one act of cheating compel
the cheater to make subsequent choices that maintain the false image even at a cost?
To answer these questions we employed a two-task paradigm such that in the first task
the participants could benefit from false reporting of private observations whereas in the
second they could benefit from making a prediction in line with their actual, rather than
their previously reported observations. Thus, for those participants who inflated their
report during the first task, sticking with that report for the second task was likely to
lead to a loss, whereas deviating from it would imply that they had lied. Data from three
experiments (total N = 116) indicate that, having lied, participants were ready to suffer
future loss rather than admit, even if implicitly, that they had lied.
Keywords: lies, binding, motivation, profit, commitment, self-presentation, impression management
INTRODUCTION
There are many reasons why people lie: to obtain material beneﬁts, to impress, to save themselves
from embarrassment or inconvenience, to avoid punishment, to protect a relationship, or even
to beneﬁt others (through white lies) (Hample, 1980; Camden et al., 1984; DePaulo et al., 1996;
DePaulo and Kashy, 1998; Robinson et al., 1998; Vrij, 2000).
Although often beneﬁcial, lies also bear some costs: lies violate the actual or perceived
consistency, which is one of the foundations of interpersonal relationships (Cialdini et al., 1995).
Lies degrade the quality of the information conveyed, thus diminishing the ability to arrive at
an informed, high-quality decision (Lewicki, 1983). Lies impair interpersonal communication
(Lewicki, 1983; Millar and Tesser, 1988; Grice, 1989). Lying entails internal psychological costs to
the liar (Mazar and Ariely, 2006; Mazar et al., 2008). Finally, getting caught lying arouses negative
emotions that aﬀect both sides (Lewicki, 1983; Sagarin et al., 1998), and may result in actions (like
punishment) against the liar (e.g., Lewicki, 1983; Mazar et al., 2008). It is thus obvious that people
would be more likely to lie when they are not afraid of being exposed (Schlenker, 1975; Baumeister
and Jones, 1978; Silverman et al., 1979; Baumeister, 1982; Leary and Kowalski, 1990; Mazar et al.,
2008).
It is often the case that the behavior that follows lying may determine the likelihood of the lie
being detected. It is therefore plausible that people would choose to act in a way that minimizes
the chance of being exposed. But to what extent? Would people be ready to forgo a beneﬁt in order
that a future action does not reveal that they had previously lied?
In the present study, we examined whether, and to what extent, a person who lied is committed
to the lie. Speciﬁcally, we wished to see if future actions made by that person would be aﬀected by
the commitment even at the cost of forgoing some proﬁt.
We are not the ﬁrst to study behavior that follows dishonest acts. For example, Both Mazar
et al. (2008) and Chance et al. (2011) gave participants tasks that assessed their ability, while having
the opportunity to dishonestly inﬂate their performance. Following these tests participants were
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asked to predict their future performance in a similar task,
this time without the opportunity to lie (for predictions of
their past performance see Mazar and Hawkins, 2015). Their
payment was determined both by their performance and by the
accuracy of their prediction. Participants over-estimated their
future performance. The authors interpret this over-estimation
as reﬂecting self-deception. We wish to consider an alternative
interpretation: impression management.
The study of lying behavior suﬀers from an inherent diﬃculty:
on the one hand, to identify an action as a lie, one needs to
observe actual behavior and compare it to the true state of aﬀairs
which is known, both by the potential liar and by the researcher.
On the other hand, if participants are aware of being watched (i.e.,
that their lies could be exposed), the probability of them lying
decreases (Mazar and Ariely, 2006).
One of the ways to deal with this dilemma is to set up a
situation in which it is clear that no single lie can be caught. At
the same time, liars can be identiﬁed with high probability by
the degree to which the aggregate of their single, unveriﬁable,
reports deviates from some reference value. Such a reference
point can be based on the behavior of other people who could
not lie when performing a similar task (Mazar and Ariely, 2006;
Mazar et al., 2008; Chance et al., 2011; Schurr et al., 2012) or
on statistical probability (Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Hilbig and Hessler, 2013). In the present
set of studies, we employed a paradigm of the latter type: the
participants repeatedly performed a task in which they could
falsely report a favorable outcome, with no fear of being caught.
However, a comparison between the proportion of trials in which
a favorable outcome was reported and the expected proportion
of such outcomes could indicate whether the participants were
likely to have lied. A subsequent task then tested how committed
the participants were to their lies (if they lied). We describe our
paradigm in the next section.
THE EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
The paradigm used here consisted of two tasks: a reporting task
and a prediction task. In the reporting task the participants drew,
privately, marbles from an opaque urn. The urn contained 100
marbles of two colors, and on each of 40 rounds the participants
drew a marble and reported its color. One of the two colors
was designated as the valuable color and reporting this color
was rewarded. Thus in this task the participants had a ﬁnancial
incentive to inﬂate the number of marbles of the rewarding
color, and did not run the risk of being caught lying. In the
second task, which had not been announced in advance, the
participants were asked to predict the number of marbles of the
rewarding color that would show up in a sample of 40 marbles.
Reward for performance in this task was based on the accuracy
of the prediction. Obviously, the number that would most likely
be accurate would be the number actually observed during the
reporting task, rather than the number reported – if the latter
had been inﬂated to obtain a larger reward. However, predicting a
number that largely deviated from the value previously reported
would constitute an admission, even if only tacit and indirect,
that one had previously lied. Importantly, in our studies such a
deviation would have no ﬁnancial cost (the opposite: it would be
ﬁnancially rewarding). The only immaterial consequence would
be that one would indirectly expose their lie. The question we
explored was whether, and to what extent, participants whose
reporting indicated they had most likely lied would be willing to
suﬀer an expected loss, by predicting a value that was congruent
with their previous report.
In what follows, we report three experiments that used this
paradigm. Experiment 1 involved two phases, each consisting
of a reporting and a predicting task, but with the second
reporting task not incentivized. Experiment 2 used a preliminary,
unincentivized, reporting task to rule out an alternative
explanation based on anchoring. In Experiment 3 we introduced
a procedure that guaranteed that reporting was anonymous to
see if, when one’s prediction could not be associated with one’s
previous reporting, participants would still be committed to their
lies.
The experimental method employed in all three experiments
reported was approved by the Human Subjects Committee of the
School of Education, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. All
the participants signed an informed consent form before taking
part in the experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of this experiment was to demonstrate that people
are willing to forgo a possible proﬁt in order to keep the false
representation they displayed. It was further designed to address
an alternative explanation based on the misperception of small
probabilities.
Method
The experiment consisted of two, within-subject phases, each
calling for the performance of the two tasks of reporting and
predicting described above. The tasks of the second phase were
identical to those of the ﬁrst phase save for the fact that there was
no incentive to lie during the reporting task. With, presumably,
no lying in the latter reporting task the value in the prediction
task was expected to correspond to the true proportion of marbles
in the urn.
In the ﬁrst phase the urn contained 35 green marbles and
65 yellow marbles and in the second phase it contained 35 blue
marbles and 65 white marbles. The participants were informed
that there were 100 marbles in the urns but they were not
informed either of the number of marbles of each color or of the
colors’ ratio. In the reporting task, a laptop computer was located
next to the urn. Both urn and computer were hidden from the
experimenter by a curtain and were visible only to the participant.
There were two keys on the computer screen, corresponding
to the colors of the marbles in the urn. The participant was to
draw a marble from the urn and report its color by clicking
the corresponding key on the computer screen. The marble
then had to be put back in the urn and the urn shuﬄed. The
participants were instructed to repeat this procedure 40 times.
Importantly, at that point the computer stopped and displayed
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to the participant the number of the less common color (green in
the incentivized reporting phase and blue in the unincentivized
reporting phase), out of 40, that he or she had reported. At
this stage the experimenter pulled the curtain aside, so the urn
was visible to both the participant and the experimenter, and
the predicting task began. The participant had to predict the
number of marbles of the less common color in a sample of 40
marbles, drawn from the urn. After the prediction had beenmade
and noted, the participant drew the marbles one at a time, and
placed each marble in one of two separate containers, sorting
the marbles by their color. Once 40 marbles had been drawn the
experimenter and the participant counted the number of marbles
of the relevant color together and compared it to the participant’s
prediction.
In the incentivized reporting task, every time the participant
pressed the “green” key, the computer added 0.5 NIS (New
Israeli Shekels, 1 NIS being worth 0.26 $ at the time of the
experiment) to the participant’s proﬁts. It should be noted that
the participants could report any color they wished without being
exposed. The procedure of reporting in the second reporting
phase was identical, but did not produce proﬁt. This latter phase
was introduced to make sure that the participants could correctly
report the number of marbles of the infrequent color after 40
draws when there was no monetary incentive to inﬂate that
number.
In the predicting task of both phases, payment was for
accuracy in predicting the number of marbles of the infrequent
color. The payment for a perfectly accurate prediction was an
additional 5 NIS, and for a prediction that deviated by one from
the number of marbles actually drawn it was 2 NIS. A prediction
that deviated by more than one was not rewarded. Note that
in the ﬁrst phase this payment schedule could pose a dilemma
for the participants who lied in the reporting task. On the one
hand, their best prediction would have been the number of green
marbles that they had actually drawn; on the other hand, if they
were bound by their lies (i.e., lied and didn’t want to get caught
lying) they should predict the number of green marbles that they
reported in the previous task. Clearly, in the latter case, those who
inﬂated the number of green marbles could expect to forgo the
reward for accuracy of prediction.
Participants
Thirty four students of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem were
recruited for the experiment. The average age was 25.36 years
(SD = 3.42 years) one student was excluded from the analysis,
because he admitted that he didn’t understand what was required
of him. 14 of the 33 participants were females.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in an empty classroom.
The experimenter conﬁrmed that the student could distinguish
between the diﬀerent colors of the marbles; those who had
diﬃculty doing so were dismissed.
The instructions of the incentivized reporting task were read
aloud and explained; written instructions were also available on
paper in front of the participant. The same sequence of reading
aloud and explaining, as well as providing written instructions,
was true for all tasks.
After the instructions were explained, the participant went
behind the curtain and started the task. Once the reporting
task was over the prediction task started, with the participant
predicting the number of green marbles that would be drawn
out of 40 marbles. After that, the participant drew 40 marbles
from the urn and sorted them by color into two boxes. The
experimenter and the participant then counted the green marbles
and the result was recorded. The second phase followed, starting
with the reporting task and continuing with the prediction task
for the blue/white urn. Finally, the total amount earned was
calculated and paid, and the participant was dismissed.
Results
The mean number of the infrequent color, reported and
predicted, for each phase and task, is presented in Figure 1.
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test
for the eﬀects of Phase, Task, and their interaction. We found
signiﬁcant main eﬀects of Phase, with the mean number higher
in the ﬁrst than in the second phase [F(1,32) = 10.583,
MSE = 37.867, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.249], and of Task, with the
mean number higher in the reporting than in the predicting task
[F(1,32) = 6.145, MSE = 10.893, p = 0.019, η2p = 0.161]. The
interaction was not signiﬁcant [F(1,32) = 0.950, MSE = 11.518,
p= 0.337, η2p = 0.029).
While the results presented above capture the overall picture,
it is easier to answer our research questions by reporting
the results of pre-planned contrasts. First, the number of
rewarding marbles reported in the ﬁrst reporting task, in which
misreporting was incentivized, was 19.55 – a value much higher
than the value of 14, expected by chance [t(32)= 4.67, p< 0.001].
The prediction made following the incentivized reporting task,
at 17.55, was also signiﬁcantly larger than 14 [t(32) = 4.36,
p < 0.001], indicating that the participants, although predicting
a value somewhat lower than the one they had reported, were
still committed to their lies. In fact, signiﬁcant diﬀerences were
observed not only between the reporting in the incentivized and
unincentivized tasks [t(32) = 3.070, p = 0.004], but also, and
most importantly, between the predictions made [t(32) = 2.609,
p = 0.014]. The latter result indicates that the participants were
ready to incur a loss in the predicting task to avoid having their
prediction expose their lie.
As expected, the prediction following the unincentivized
reporting task of the second phase (14.64) was not signiﬁcantly
higher than 14. However, the report in that phase (15.48) was, in
fact, higher [t(32) = 2.488, p = 0.018]. We have no explanation
for this result but it may be another indication of binding lies:
participants may have suspected that the second reporting task
could somehow expose their having lied before. Either way,
the value of 15.48 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from either 19.55
[p= 0.004) or 17.55 (p= 0.032) in the incentivized phase.
To check if these ﬁndings may have resulted from a
misperception of a diﬀerence in the statistical properties of the
two procedures, reporting (calculating the expected proportion
when drawing from an urn with replacement) and predicting
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FIGURE 1 | Average of non-frequent marbles (reported or predicted) by phase (Experiment 1).
(calculating the expected proportion when drawing from an urn
without replacement), we ran a control study with 39 subjects,
none of whom had participated in the other study. In this study
participants were presented with a written description of the
procedure and results of the previously ran study, and asked
what could have brought about these results. Only one of the
39 subjects gave an answer that could have been interpreted as
referring to a diﬀerence between the statistical probabilities in the
two procedures.
A comparison of earnings in the prediction tasks of the two
phases (see Figure 2) revealed that earnings in the ﬁrst phase
(Mean Payment = 0.636 NIS, SD = 1.517) were indeed lower
than that in the second phase [Mean Payment = 1.303 NIS,
SD= 1.811; t(32)= 1.785, p= 0.042, one tailed]. In other words,
had participants predicted what they must have actually observed
while performing the incentivized reporting task they could have
earned twice as much than they did. All in all, we conclude
that the participants were willing to risk future gains rather than
tacitly admit having lied before.
EXPERIMENT 2
It could be argued that the inﬂated number of green marbles
reported (and then displayed) in the incentivized reporting task
did not bind participants but served as an anchor for the next
task. In other words, this claim means that the participants knew
that while performing the reporting task they had retrieved fewer
green marbles than they reported. It is therefore possible that,
when they had to predict the number of greenmarbles that would
FIGURE 2 | Mean payment for prediction in the two phases
(Experiment 1).
be drawn; their correct estimate was drawn upward through
anchoring, which resulted in an intermediate value.
In Experiment 2 we addressed the anchoring issue, while
replicating the previous results.
Method
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1, but included a
preliminary, unincentivized reporting task, and no second phase.
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In the preliminary reporting task the participants did exactly what
they did later in the incentivized reporting task, but they did
not get any money for reporting “green.” For the preliminary
task to make sense we asked the participants to use tongs to
pull the marbles out of the urn – which was no simple matter –
the unincentivized reporting task was described as “practice.”
At the end of the practice task the number of green marbles
participants reported was presented to them on the computer
screen. Following practice the participants performed the second,
incentivized, reporting task followed by the prediction task –
both identical to the tasks performed in Experiment 1 (except for
the requirement to use tongs to draw marbles one by one). As
before, in both reporting tasks it was possible for the participants
to report that they had drawn a green marble even if it was of
the other color. In this experiment the practice task served as a
control in that it provided another possible anchor.
Participants
Thirty nine students of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem were
recruited for the experiment. The average age was 25.64 years
(SD = 3.04 years). Eighteen of the participants were females.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as the procedure of Experiment 1,
except for the use of the tongs, the inclusion of a practice task,
and the absence of a second phase.
Results
The average draws (reported and predicted) of the green
marbles are presented for each task in Figure 3. We analyzed
the results across all the participants with one-way repeated
measures ANOVA. We found a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the three tasks [F(2,76) = 9.398, MSE = 7.687, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.198]. The mean reported in the ﬁrst, unincentivized
task was closest to the expected value of 14, the mean reported
FIGURE 3 | Average of green marbles (reported or predicted)
(Experiment 2).
in the second, incentivized, task was much higher, and the
mean in the predicting task was somewhere in between. A ﬁner
contrast analysis that compared the mean number of green
marbles in the predicting task separately to the mean reported
in the practice task and to that reported in the incentivized
task showed the prediction to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from both
[F(1,38) = 4.787, MSE = 12.340, p = 0.035, η2p = 0.112 and
F(1,38) = 6.050, MSE = 14.256, p = 0.019, η2p = 0.137, for
the practice and the incentivized reporting tasks, respectively].
We examined the diﬀerences between every two tasks with
paired-sample t-tests. All of the diﬀerences were signiﬁcant:
the diﬀerence between the practice task and the incentivized
reporting task [t(38) = 3.841, p < 0.001], the diﬀerence
between the incentivized reporting task and the prediction
task [t(38) = 2.46, p = 0.019], and the diﬀerence between
the prediction task and the practice task [t(38) = 2.188,
p= 0.035].
These results replicate the results of Experiment 1: apparently
at least some of the participants reported more green marbles
than they had really drawn, that is to say, they lied. In the
prediction task the participants predicted a lower number of
green marbles than they had reported, but their prediction was
not as low as what they had most likely seen in the two preceding
reporting tasks.
Because the number of rewarding marbles observed by each
subject is unknown, it is impossible to calculate how much proﬁt
participants had foregone by being bound by their lies. For
approximation we calculated the mean payment the participants
would have earned had they predicted the expected value (14).
In that case they would have earned 1.513 NIS (see Figure 4);
the diﬀerence between that and what they earned is signiﬁcant
[t(38) = 1.842, p= 0.036, one tailed, paired sample t-test].
The number reported during practice also diﬀered from the
expected value (14) [t(38) = 2.555, p = 0.015]. We have no
explanation for this deviation, which could have resulted by
chance. In any case, it does not bear on our main ﬁnding.
FIGURE 4 | Mean payment for prediction compared to a prediction of
14 (Experiment 2).
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In Experiment 2 we not only replicated the ﬁndings of
Experiment 1, but also ruled out an alternative explanation based
on anchoring. The participants sampled the urn twice, and could
anchor on either of the two values reported. The up deviation
of the predicted value (16.95) from both the value expected by
chance (14) and the value reported and displayed in the practice
task is a clear indication that participants decided to stick to
their inﬂated reports. At the same time, the diﬀerence between
the reporting that was incentivized (18.44) and the subsequent
prediction indicates not only that the participants were likely
aware of the true proportion of green marbles in the urn, but also
that they tried to “reduce” the damage caused by sticking to their
inﬂated reports.
EXPERIMENT 3
Our main thesis is that behavior following a lie is aﬀected by the
lie in that the liar attempts to ensure that the act of lying is not
exposed, even at a cost. Still, it could be claimed that what we
regarded as the tell-tale indication of such an attempt – the large
deviation of the prediction from the value expected by chance –
resulted from other factors such as a failure to correctly estimate
the proportion of the infrequent-color (green) marbles in the
urn, self-deception (as would be predicted by the theory of self-
concept maintenance Mazar et al., 2008; Chance et al., 2011), or
still, by some anchoring. To test these alternative explanations
we created in Experiment 3 a non-binding situation: not only
could participants exaggerate their “report” of the number of
rewarding marbles drawn with impunity, but also no one could
tell how many rewarding marbles they reported. Thus, it would
be impossible to ﬁnd out if their prediction diﬀered from their
report, which would have implicated them as liars. We reasoned
that under such conditions people would not be bound to their
lies. On the other hand, if inﬂated predictions were the results
of failures of estimation, self-deception, or anchoring they would
remain higher than expected by chance, as was observed in the
previous two experiments.
Method
This experiment was similar to Experiment 2 but with some
changes: only in the practice stage did participants report into
a computer. In the second stage, to allow participants to inﬂate
their “reports,” and still not be connected to that “report” (so that
no one could tell if their prediction deviated from it), they had
to count the number of draws and the number of green marbles
for themselves. That way we could not tell, for any individual
participant, how many green marbles she claimed to have drawn.
Participants could use pen and paper but it was not obligatory.
It was emphasized in the instructions that even if the participants
were to use such aids, they would keep them and the experimenter
would have no access to them.
At the end of the drawing the participant was presented
with a large number of unmarked envelopes, each containing 40
0.50-shekel coins, and was asked to select one of the envelopes
at random and take out as many coins as there were green
marbles in the sample previously drawn, then place the unmarked
envelope, with the remaining, unclaimed coins, in a large box.
Because several participants performed the experiment at the
same time we could not tell, for any individual participant, how
many green marbles she had claimed to draw. At the same
time, we could easily ﬁnd out how many coins, on average,
the participants had taken. Following that stage each participant
engaged in the prediction task, in a diﬀerent room.
Participants
Forty three students of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem were
recruited for the experiment. The average age was 24.35 years
(SD= 2.43 years). Nineteen of the participants were females.
Procedure
After the experimenter made sure that the participants could tell
the diﬀerence between the marbles’ diﬀerent colors they entered
the lab in groups of 4–8 participants in each session. Each
participant worked alone at her own pace in a diﬀerent cubicle.
It was made clear to the participants that the experimenter could
not see what they were doing. The participants got the materials –
urn, tongs, instructions, pen, and a sheet of paper – and began the
practice task, reporting into the computer. When they ﬁnished
doing that, they raised their hand and the experimenter came in
and gave them the written instructions for the second task. He
made sure that they understood the instructions and went into
the other room. The participants repeated the procedure, this
time without the computer.
Participants were then instructed to select one of the
unmarked envelopes and to take as many coins out of the 40 as
the number of green marbles they had previously drawn from the
urn. They then sealed the envelope and put it in the box.
After the participants put the envelope in the box, they took
the same urn they used before and went to the next room, where
they performed the prediction task as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
As mentioned before, the expected number of green marbles
was 14. Figure 5 presents the average number of green
marbles as reported in the practice task, as derived from the
number of coins removed from the envelopes, and predicted.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of stage
[F(2,126) = 4.66, MSE = 21.625, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.069).
A post hoc comparison revealed that the mean number of
coins claimed (corresponding to the values “reported” in the
incentivized stage) was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from both the value
reported in the practice task and that predicted (p = 0.031,
p = 0.035 respectively), whereas the values of the practice
and the predicting task were not diﬀerent from each other
(p = 0.999). Furthermore, one sample t-test revealed that the
average of the green marbles in the incentivized reporting
task was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the expected value of 14
[t(42) = 2.25, p = 0.016], whereas the other two values were
not [t(42) = −0.751, p = 0.457 for the practice task, and
t(42) = −0.599, p = 0.553 for the predicting task]. The earnings
in the prediction phase (Mean Payment = 0.837, SD = 1.557)
were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1.139, that they would have
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FIGURE 5 | Average of green marbles (those reported in the practice,
those derived from the coins taken, and those predicted)
(Experiment 3).
earned had they predicted 14 [t(42) = −0.897, p = 0.375) (see
Figure 6).
The results of this experiment clearly demonstrate that when
the lie was anonymous and there was no one who could call it out,
the participants were no longer bound by it. Their predictions
show that given such “non-bindingness” they easily made a
prediction commensurate with the actual number of marbles of
the infrequent color, and maximized their proﬁts. It should be
noted that, although in this experiment we couldn’t distinguish
between lying and steeling as did Mazar and Zhong (2010), given
that participants were instructed to take out the number they
FIGURE 6 | Mean payment for prediction compared to a prediction of
14 (Experiment 3).
sampled, the excess coins they took can be regarded as stealing
by lying.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this research was to study aspects of behavior
following a lie. Speciﬁcally, we asked to what extent people
would be ready to forgo a beneﬁt in order not to imply, by
a future action, that they had previously lied. We devised a
sequence of two tasks, both involving the state of the same world.
The ﬁrst task allowed for proﬁtable, voluntary lying behavior,
in which the participants were assured, by the nature of the
task that the experimenter could not tell if and when they had
lied. Yet, a comparison of the overall statistical characteristics
of a participant’s report with the statistical characteristics of the
environment could indicate the likelihood that lying had taken
place. In the subsequent unexpected task, beneﬁts would have
been higher if the true state of the world, rather than that implied
by one’s previous reports, were used. As the second task was
unexpected, the beneﬁts of previously reporting the true state of
the world could not be foreseen. This setup created a possible
dilemma for liars, because deviation from their report in the
initial task would constitute an implicit admission of having lied.
The way our participants resolved the dilemma, when it existed,
allowed us to assess the degree to which false reports bound the
participants later on.
In Experiment 1, we have shown that people are willing to
risk future proﬁt or even forgo it altogether, in order not to get
caught in a lie. The explanation we oﬀer for such behavior is that
people are “bound” to a lie they told, and are compelled by it
to a certain behavior. That is, after providing the experimenter
with a false report of the proportion of the proﬁtable marbles,
that person feels committed to that false representation in the
sense that the person subsequently continues to predict a higher
proportion than the proportion that would have most probably
yielded a larger gain (but which would have been hard to justify
in light of the previous report).
In Experiment 2, we have replicated these results and
eliminated an alternative explanation based on anchoring, by
repeating the reporting task with no incentive to lie – a task
in which reporting turned out to be much closer to the value
expected on statistical grounds.
In Experiment 3, we have shown that when there is no
audience to the false presentation then there is no commitment to
the lie. By creating a situation of a non-binding lie and showing
that in that case participants felt free to act diﬀerently (and in
line with what was more proﬁtable) in the reporting and the
predicting task, we have dismissed alternative explanations like
an inability to correctly estimate the proportion of marbles of the
infrequent color in the urn, self-deception, or anchoring.
It is important to note that the commitment to the lie does not
stem from the risk of punishment, as even if inconsistent reports
in the two tasks indirectly indicated that a person had lied, there
was no sanctioning mechanism in our studies. Furthermore,
when misrepresentation cannot be detected, as in Experiment 3,
participants did not seek to be coherent with their reports.
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The theory of self-concept maintenance (Mazar et al., 2008)
explains well why participants did not lie “all the way” when
they had an opportunity to do so. It is possible that the extra
gains they made were exactly what struck a balance between
monetary temptation and keeping one’s self-image intact. This
theory also provides an explanation for the self-deception in
performance prediction described in Chance et al. (2011). In
the latter, participants may have been unaware of how much
they were aided by the answers sheet, and that enabled them to
deceive themselves unlike in our experiments. In the experiments
reported here every lie was very prominent for the participants
as they held the marble of the unproﬁtable color in their hand
and clicked the proﬁtable color key on the computer screen
(Experiments 1 and 2) or marked it on paper (Experiment 3).
It might be that failing to maintain a self-concept of honesty,
people proceed to (perhaps less desirable) honest impression
management. It could be that when participants in Mazar and
Hawkins (2015) who inﬂated their performance evaluation after
lying, may also have engaged in impression-management rather
than in deceiving themselves.
The contrast in prediction behavior between Experiment 3 and
the previous 2 experiments shows that the commitment to the lie
is of impression management and not a result of self-deception.
All in all our results indicate that people feel bound by their
lies and that, once having told a lie, they are willing to risk future
proﬁts in order not to be exposed as having lied.
Not all lies commit liars. Additional research should address
the motivation of lying and classify the situations in which
lies bind the liar. We think that people sometimes use
lies as means of impression management and, as long as
possible, would prefer to deceive oneself rather than admit
to have lied. But when this is impossible, looking honest
would become an important target behavior, even if costly.
Impression management could be particularly strong for lies
in which one embellishes reality, presenting oneself as better
as or more competent than one really is. At the same time,
impression management using lies could have a positive eﬀect
through binding, by becoming a commitment to the lie, a
motivation and a tool for establishing and improving self-
identity.
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